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1 Introduction 
Consider an economie situation where two (or more) economie agents interact 
strategically with each other infinitely often, and, simultaneously, have the opportu-
nity to negotiate over some joint policy which will be implemented if agreed upon 
(for example, all countries compete with each other on the world market and at the 
same time negotiate at the GATT). In this context the negotiation process and the 
strategie interaction simultaneously continue as time proceeds. The consequences for 
the agents are that each agent not only has to select a strategy in the negotiation 
process, but at the same time has to decide what strategy to follow in the strategie 
interaction as long as no agreement is reached. The strategie interaction is modelled 
as an infinitely repeated static game1 and an agreement specifies a joint policy of 
how to play this infinitely repeated game (to refer to the example given earlier, one 
joint policy could be that all countries stop levying a tax on imports). It is assumed 
that agreements are binding and have an infinite length. Furthermore, attention is 
restricted to economie situation with only two agents. 
In order to model the idea that players have the opportunity to bargaining among 
each other, not only before the repeated game starts, but especially during the re-
peated game, the alternating offer model with discounting (Rubinstein [14]) is ex-
tended so that the two players have to play the static game in between the bargain-
ing rounds of the alternating offer model. This model, without the assumption of 
discounting, has been analysed by Okada [12]. Related models are those of Bush and 
Wen [2], Fernandez and Glazier [8], Haller and Holden [10] and, Houba and de Zeeuw 
[11]. For a discussion of related work we refer to section 7. 
To be more explicit about the bargaining model considered in this paper, each 
period consists of three stages. In the first stage one of the players proposes a contract, 
where a contract has to be seen as an infinite sequence of actions in the infinitely 
repeated (static) game. At the second stage the other player either accepts or rejects 
this proposed contract. If the proposed contract is rejected, then the static game at 
the third stage has to be played once by both players before play proceeds to the 
next period. In this situation each player selects his/her actions at the third stage 
unilaterally. These actions are called the disagreement actions. As mentioned before, 
the strategies in this bargaining game not only involve the bargaining behaviour of 
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each agent but also the disagreement actions of each agent. This means that the 
disagreement actions chosen by a player at a certain period may depend upon the 
history of bargaining behaviour itself and/or may influence the bargaining behaviour 
of the other player in the future. 
In case the proposed contract is accepted it becomes binding. The bargaining 
model in this paper is rich enough to allow for renegotiation in the true sense of the 
word, namely players continue bargaining for some new contract, while the last con-
tract accepted in the past specifies the disagreement actions as long as the players do 
not agree upon such a new contract. Given that the disagreement actions are fixed 
in such a subgame the model reduces to the Standard alternating offer model [14] 
with exogenous status quo payoffs, which yields a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SPE) outcome, namely immediate agreement upon a Pareto efficiënt contract. 
Thus, any inefficiënt contract agreed upon will be replaced by some new and efficiënt 
contract. Therefore, the renegotiation process will be disregarded in this paper by 
assuming that players can only propose efficiënt contracts. 
The bargaining model in this paper always has at least one stationary SPE in 
which both players use one of the Nash equilibria (NE) of the static game as their 
disagreement actions and bargain according to the stationary SPE of the alternating 
offer model [14] as if the disagreement actions were exogenously given. It will be 
shown that, as the (common) discount factor tends to 1, each player can guarantee 
himself a minimum payoff that may be higher than this player's minmax value. This 
implies that the limit set of SPE payoffs need not necessarily be the whole set of 
individually rational payoffs. For a large class of static games (as in examples 6.4 
and 6.5) this convergence result immediately implies that bargaining with binding 
contracts strictly reduces the set of SPE payoffs predicted by the Folk-Theorem (Fu-
denberg and Maskin [9]). However, the prisoners' dilemma (example 6.1) shows that 
a full Folk-Theorem can also be obtained. 
The strategy space of the bargaining model in this paper is very complex and it 
seems not possible to derive a full characterisation result for the set of SPE payoffs. 
To show this, two types of strategies are defined, namely what we call "immediate 
agreement" strategies and "one sided offer" strategies. For each type of strategy a 
"full" characterisation result will be given as well as a procedure to determine the 
"extreme" SPE payoffs attainable with such a type of strategies. The characterisation 
result for "immediate agreement" strategies generalises a characterisation result of 
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Bush and Wen [2] to the bargaining game in this paper. The characterisation result 
for the "one sided offer" strategies is interesting because there is a relation between 
these strategies and weakly renegotiation proof equilibria of standard repeated games 
(Farrell and Maskin [7]). Each of these two characterisation results determines a set 
of SPE payoffs. Exampies 6.2 and 6.3 show that it is not possible to prove that one 
of these two sets always contains the other set. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the bargaining model will be 
formally described. In section 3 it is shown that the bargaining model always has at 
least one stationary SPE. Hence, the set of equilibria will never be empty. In section 4 
the characterisation result for the "immediate agreement" strategies is derived, while 
in section 5 the characterisation result for the "one sided offer" strategies will be 
given. In section 6 five important exampies are given. Section 7 discusses related 
work, while in section 8 some conclusions are drawn. 
2 The Model 
The bargaining model in this paper is a dynamic non-cooperative two-player 
model in discrete time. This model is an extension of the alternating offer model 
(Rubinstein [14]). Each period t, t € N, consists of three stages 6 = 1,2,3. In 
each third stage the players have to play a static game, denoted by F. At the first 
stage of each period one of the players makes a proposal, which is either accepted 
or rejected by the other player at the second stage. Without loss of generality it 
is assumed that player 1 is the player who proposes when t is even, which implies 
that player 2 proposes when t is odd. See figure 2.1 for an illustration of the game tree. 
t even stage 1 Player 1 proposes a contract. 
stage 2 Player 2 accepts/rejects. 
stage 3 Both players play T. 
t odd stage 1 Player 2 proposes a contract. 
stage 2 Player 1 accepts/rejects. 
stage 3 Both players play T. 
Figure 2.1 The game tree of the bargaining model. 
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A proposal made at time t, t € N, specifies a path of actions in the infinitely 
repeated game, denoted by r°°, from period t onward. Thus, each proposal specifies 
an infinite stream of payoffs for both players. With respect to a proposal the following 
assumption is made. 
Assumption 2.1 A proposal is a contract of infinite length that becomes binding 
once agreed upon. 
To evaluate a stream of payoffs players discount the expected value of this stream. 
Discounting only takes place after the third stage of each period and before the 
beginning of the next period. Formally, given player i's stream of (expected) payoffs 
{a;,(r)}^l0 the normalised payoff for this player given the common discount factor 6, 
8 £ (0,1), from period t, t £ N, onwards is 
(1 - 6) E~
 t ^ x , ( r ) . 
In what follows below we assume that players can use mixed strategies in the static 
game T. With respect to the observability of mixed actions the following assumption 
is made. 
Assumption 2.2 Mixed actions are observable. 
The Static Game V. 
The static game T is a two-player normal form game, which is defined formally as 
r = < { 1 , 2 } , {Si}i=h2, {Ri(s)}i=1,2>, 
with {1,2} the set of players, 5,- the compact and convex set of (mixed) actions and 
player i's payoff function i?, : S —> R, which is continuous and quasi concave in s,-, 
given the (mixed) actions s € S := S\ x £>2- These assumptions are sufficiënt for the 
existence of (possibly mixed) Nash equilibria (NE) in I\ The set of attainable payoffs 
in T is denoted by R(S). Formally, 
R(S) = {x eB2 \3seS s.t. x = R{s)}, 
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where R(s) = (Ri(s),R2(s)). The convex huil of R(S) is denoted by R(C). Because 
R(S) is compact, R(C) is also compact. 
The minmax value v, for player i (i = 1,2) and the corresponding pair of (mixed) 
actions, denoted by ra' €E S, are given by 
Vi = min max Ri(s) and ra* = arg min maxi2,(s) 
(j = 1,2, j ^ i). The set F of individually rational payoffs in R(C) is defined as 
F = {x E R(C) | a;,- > v{, i = 1,2}. 
With respect to the set F we make the following assumption. 
Assumption 2.3 The weak Pareto efficiënt frontier of F coincides with the strong 
Pareto efficiënt frontier of F. 
This assumption implies that the Pareto efficiënt frontier can be represented by a 
strictly drecreasing function. 
Finally, we define the function gi : S —» R + (i = 1,2) as 
gi(s) = ma.xRi(s\si) - Ri(s), 
sieSi 
where s\i,- means that player i deviates from the pair of actions s by playing êi. The 
function <7,(s) expresses the net gain player i can obtain by playing a best response 
against player j ' s (mixed) action Sj E Sj. It is obvious that <7;(s) > 0 for all s E S. 
Furthermore, if 5,- 6 Si is a best response to Sj £ Sj, then gi(s) = 0. In what follows 
gi(s) = 0 will used as short hand notation for saying that s,- (E 5,- is a best reponse 
against Sj € Sj. A analogous interpretation has gi(s) > 0 when st- is not a best 
reponse. Note that sN € S is a pair of NE actions if and only if gi(sN) = g2(sN) = 0. 
By definition, it follows that we can write maxsig5i 7?,(s\s,) — /2,(s) -f- ^,(s). In 
what follows the right hand side of this equality will be frequently used to denote 
max5,es, Ri{s\ii). 
Behaviour Strategies. 
A (proposed) contract specifies a path of actions ir := {S(T)}%.0, S(T) E S, 
in the infinitely repeated game T°° (where r = 0 denotes the first period of the 
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contract). Define Q := ü^oS 1 as the space of all feasible contracts in T°°. The set 
of replies at the second stage is {A,R}, where A stands for accept and R for reject. 
The history of the game will be denoted by h(t,9), t G N, 9 = 1,2,3. Formally, 
h(t,l) G H(t,l) := Hlz}0(Q x {A,R} x S), h(t,2) G H(t,2) := H(t,l) x Q and 
h{t,3) e H{t,S) := H(t,2) x {A,R}. 
A strategy o~i(h(t, 0)) for player i, i = 1,2, is a function which describes the action 
player i will take at stage 9 in period t given the history h(t,0) G H(t,9). The 
assumptions that contracts are binding and Pareto efficiënt mean that if players have 
agreed upon the contract ir = {S(T)}^LQ G Q at time t, then ai(h(t + r, 3)) = s,-(r) 
for r G N. 
It is assumed that both players have perfect recall. The equilibrium concept will 
be subgame perfectness (SPE) (see Selten [15]). 
The Set of Attainable Payoffs. 
The set of attainable payoffs in the bargaining model is simply the normalised dis-
counted value of the stream of (expected) payoffs in the repeated game T°°. Without 
loss of generality we will take R(C) as the set of normalised payoffs in the bargaining 
model. This assumption is justified, because for games T with R(S) / R(C) every 
x G R(C) is a convex combination of some y,z G R{S) iff S > | (Sorin [16]). The 
implication of this assumption is that for any payoff vector c* G R(C) we can find 
a contract C* of infinite length that specifies some path TC with normalised payoffs 
equal to c*. Also for any a G R(C) there exists a pair of strategies cr(h(t,9)) with 
payoffs equal to a. In what follows a large part of the analysis will be done in the 
payoff space rather than in the strategy space. This means that we are able to work 
in the set of attainable payoffs and do not have to specify explicitly the path that is 
specified by the contract. 
Whatever the equilibrium payoffs, it is obvious that these have to be at least the 
minmax value for each player. Thus, the set of equilibrium payoffs must be a subset 
of the set of individually rational payoffs F. Define the maximum payoff in F (F is 
compact) that player i, i = 1,2, can obtain as 
R?" = max {ai | ( a i ,a2) G F} . 
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The orthogonal projection of the set F on the x,-axis, i = 1,2, is the interval /,• = 
[vi, R™ax] of attainable and rational payoffs for player i. Given the interval ƒ,-, i = 1,2, 
a function fj : ƒ,• —* Ij, i ^ j , can be defined that describes the maximum payoff in F 
for player j given payoff X{ E h for player i. Formally, f\ : h—* h and ƒ2 : Ji —> 2^ 
are defined as 
ƒ1 (^2) = max {ai | {a1,x2) £ F} and /2(xi) = max {a2 \ (xi,a2) € F } . 
The function fj(xi) is a continuous and concave function on /,-, because F is com-
pact and convex. Assumption 2.3 implies that the function fj is single peaked. We 
define R* as the argument of fj for which this function attains its maximum, that 
is R^ax = fj(R*). Note that (R^R?**) is one of the two endpoints of the curve of 
Pareto efficiënt payoffs of the set F. 
The bargaining procedure of this paper allows for renegotiation of inefficiënt con-
tracts. Any subgame in which an inefficiënt contract is agreed upon can be refor-
mulated as an alternating offer model [14] in which the cake is represented by the 
set F and the status quo payoffs are determined by the inefficiënt contract. From 
(Rubinstein [14]) it follows that this subgame has a unique SPE in which players 
reach an immediate agreement which is also Pareto efficiënt. In other words, each 
inefficiënt contract will be immediately replaced by some new and efficiënt contract.2 
Therefore, we make the following simplifying assumption. 
Assumption 2.4 Only Pareto efficiënt contracts are perrnitted. 
Finally, the set F+ C F is defined as 
F+ := {xeF \x>(RÏ,Rl) }. 
The set F+ is non-empty and compact, because F is compact and (R^,R2) G F. The 
following example illustrates the several definitions. 
Example 2.1 (Battle-of-the-sexes) 
L2 R2 
Ri\ 
(1,3) (0,0) 
(0,0) (3,1) 
This game has the property that R(S) / R(C). For 6 > \ the payoff space is 
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R(C) = convexhuïl{(0,0),(1,3),(3,1)}. The minmax values Vi = v2 = f, the set 
of individually rational payoffs F = {x € R(C) \ x > (f, f)}, h = h = [f, 3] and 
Rmax _ Rmax = 3. The function f2(x1) is 
MXl>-\4-xu ^€11,3] 
and attains it maximum in R^ — 1. The decreasing part of f2(xi) describes the Pareto 
efficiënt frontier of F. Furthermore, F+ = {x € F | x > (1,1)}. Thus, F+ ^ F for 
this example. 
3 Propert ies of the Set of Equilibrium PayofFs 
In this section some properties of the set of equilibrium payoffs are derived. First, 
it will be shown that the set of SPE payoffs is non-empty by showing that at least 
one stationary SPE exists.3 Stationary SPE's are closely related to the unique SPE 
of the alternating offer model if in the latter model the cake is represented by the set 
F and one of the NE's is taken as the exogenously given status quo (or threat) point. 
In the second part of this section it will be shown that all the limit SPE payoffs, as 
6 goes to 1, belong to the subset F+. Thus, the limit set of SPE payofFs has to be 
contained in the set F+. 
Proposi t ion 3.1 There exists at least one stationary SPE. 
Proof 
The conditions on T are sufficiënt to ensure that at least one NE exists. Choose 
a NE of T and denote sN G S as the corresponding NE actions. Define the function 
p : F - • F as 
p2(y) = max{iE2*, (1 - 6)R2(sN) + 6y2}, Pl(y) = Mp^y)), 
and the function q : F —* F as 
qi(x) = m a x { ^ , ( l - 6)R1(sN) + &rx}, q2(x) = f2(qi(x)). 
Brouwer's fixed point theorem can be applied to prove that p x q : F x F —* F x F 
has a fixed point (x,y) = (p(y),q(x)). Consider the following strategies 
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Player 1 proposes x G F and player 2 accepts if x2 > (1 — 8)R2(sN) + £y2-
Player 2 proposes y G -F and player 1 accepts t/i > (1 — 8)R1(sN) + 8x^. 
As long as both players do not agree the disagreement actions are sN. 
These stationary strategies are SPE if and only if (x, y) is a fixed point of the function 
p x q. To see this, note that the gain gi(sN) = 0, i = 1,2 so that none of the players 
has an incentive to deviate at the third stage. Given y is the SPE outcome at the 
next period, player 2 can guarantee himself (1 — 8)R2(sN) + 6y2 and this player will 
not accept less than this value. Therefore, in case R2 < (1 — S)R2(sN) + 8y2, player 
I's best proposal is x and in the other case, R^ > (1 — 6)R2(sN) + óy2, player I's best 
proposal is x = (R™ax,Rl). Hence, x is an SPE outcome given y is an SPE outcome 
one period later. Similarly, y is an SPE outcome when x is an SPE outcome. ü 
Corollary 3.1 If sN G S is not Pareto efficiënt and pïayers follow the stationary 
SPE strategies above, then (i) it is advantagous to be the first proposer, (ii) both 
players reach an immediate agreement, (Ui) the contracts are Pareto efficiënt and 
(iv) x and y converge to the symmetrie Nash bargaining solution with threat point 
R(sN) as 8 goes to 1. 
In the next sections much attention is paid to the limit set of SPE payoffs as 8 
goes to 1. Here we will derive a simple convergence result that says nothing more 
than that player i can guarantee himself at least R* as S goes to 1. Hence, in the 
limit, every SPE payoff for player i has to be greater than or equal to this level. 
This implies that every limit SPE payoff a G F has to satisfy the following condition: 
a > (R^R^), or equivalently a G F+. The reader is warned that this proposition 
does not say that the limit set of SPE payoffs equals the set F+. Examples 6.2 and 
6.3 illustrate this point. 
Proposition 3.2 For any period t (t G N j : The set of SPE payoffs converges to a 
subset of F+ as 8 goes to 1. 
Proof. 
If F+ = F the statement is trivial. Therefore, assume that F+ C F. Suppose 
a(h(t,6)) is a pair of strategies such that player I's payoff is strictly less than R^ at 
time t (t even). Consider the following deviation for player 1. Player 1 proposes the 
contract C with payoffs c = (R^R™0,1) at the first stage of period t. Whatever, the 
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pair of strategies <r(h(t, 0)) is, player 2's continuation payoff of following this pair of 
strategies will be at most R%ax. Therefore, player 2 will accept the proposed contract 
C. Hence, this deviation is profitable for player 1 and a(h(t, 0)) can not be a pair of 
SPE strategies. 
Given that player I's SPE payoff at any time t (t even) cannot be less than R^ 
it follows that player 1 can secure himself a payoff of (1 — 8)vi + 8R$ at the third 
stage of period t — 1. Therefore, at the second stage of period t — 1, player 1 will 
certainly reject any contract that yields a payoff lower than this value. When 8 goes 
to 1 it follows that player I's security level goes to R^. At the third stage of period 
t — 2 player 1 can again secure himself of a payoff that is at least v\ in t — 2 and a 
continuation payoff of at least (1 — ê)vi + 8R{. Therefore, player I's security level at 
the third stage of period t — 2 is at least (1 — S2)vi + S2Rl. Again, this value converges 
to Rl as 8 goes to 1. Hence, player I's security level at any stage and in any period 
converges to R% as 8 goes to 1. 
Similarly, player 2's security level at any stage and in any period converges to i?2 
as 8 goes to 1. This means that every element a € F that belongs to the limit set of 
SPE payoffs has to satisfy a > (R$, R£). • 
4 "Immediate Agreement" Strategies 
The strategies introduced and analysed in this section are called "immediate agree-
ment" strategies, because if players follow this type of strategies then they immedi-
ately reach agreement in every subgame. The stationary strategies of proposition 3.1 
are a special case of the type of strategies in this section. When players follow the 
stationary SPE strategies of proposition 3.1 the payoffs of the proposed contract de-
pend heavily upon the disagreement outcome when players would end up in perpetual 
disagreement. In particular, as 8 goes to 1, the stationary SPE outcome converges 
to the (symmetrie) Nash bargaining solution with the perpetual disagreement out-
come as the threat vector. The higher player j ' s disagreement payoff (j = 1,2) in 
all periods t where player i (i = 1,2, i / j) proposes, the higher player j ' s SPE 
payoff will be. Similarly, the lower player i's disagreement payoff in all periods where 
player j proposes, the higher player j ' s SPE payoff will be. This means that if other 
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disagreement actions can be supported in an SPE, then new SPE's are obtained. 
Using stationary strategies, as in the previous section, is not enough to obtain new 
SPE's, because all stationary SPE strategies must satisfy that the disagreement ac-
tions are best responses against each other in order to prevent unilateral deviation. 
In other words, the disagreement actions have to be NE actions in case stationary 
SPE strategies are constructed. 
The question addressed in this section is how can more general strategies be 
constructed that yield a higher SPE payofF to player j (j = 1,2) but have different 
disagreement actions than NE actions. In other words, these strategies have to satisfy 
i) player j ' s disagreement payoff in periods where the other player proposes is at least 
as high as the "best" NE payoff for this player, ii) player i's disagreement payoff 
(i = 1,2, i / j) in all periods where player j proposes is at most this player's "worst" 
NE payoff, iii) both players reach immediate agreement in every period and iv) no 
player has an incentive to deviate from playing these strategies. Without loss of 
generality, player i is player 1 and player j is player 2. 
The type of strategies in this section, introduced by Bush and When [2], are such 
that in all odd periods player 1 is rewarded with some good contract offered by player 
2 when player 1 has used the prescribed disagreement actions one period before and 
is punished with some bad contract offered by player 2 after a deviation by player 1. 
Thus, the contract offered by player 2 depends upon the actual action player 1 has 
used one period before. One could call these strategies "compensation" strategies, 
because player 1 is compensated by the good contract for the loss of not playing a 
best response against the disagreement action of player 2 one period earlier. 
Before the strategies are described formally, we first define the state dependent 
contract player 2 will offer player 1. Let e 6 R+ denote the compensation player 2 
offers player 1 at time t + 1 (t even) and define the state dependent contract y : S —> R 
(at time t + 1) as follows 
-w))={;+c'othfi:e:;' 
•/*«<)) = MvM>))), 
where s(t) denotes the actual pair of actions used at time t, a player I's payoff 
independent of the compensation and s\ € Si the action player 1 is supposed to play 
at time t. 
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Let x*, y* and sN be a stationary SPE strategy as formulated in proposition 3.1 
and choose sN such that the stationary SPE strategy is the stationary SPE strategy 
that yields the highest payoff to player 2. The "immediate agreement" strategies, 
introduced by Bush and When [2], are defined as follows. 
t even Stage 1 Player 1 proposes a contract with payoff 
x2 = max{i?2,(l - S)R2(se) + 6y2(se)} and xx = fi(x2). 
Stage 2 Player 2 accepts x if x2 > (1 — 8)R2(se) + 8y2(se). 
Stage 3 If players did not agree before, then se are the disagree-
ment actions with payoff R(se). 
t + 1 Stage 1 Player 2 proposes a contract with payoff 
2/!(se) = max{.R*, (1 - 8)R1(s°) + 8Xl} + c and 
y2(*e) = f2(yi(se)), 
Stage 2 Player 1 accepts y if j/i > (1 — 8)Ri(s°) + 8x\. 
Stage 3 If players did not agree before, then s° are the disagree-
ment actions with payoff R(s°). 
If player 2 deviates, then both players immediately follow the stationary SPE 
strategy with contracts x* and y*. 
The notation is chosen in such a way that se € S and s° € S denote the dis-
agreement actions at the even periods and at the odd periods respectively. The next 
proposition states the necessary and sufficiënt conditions that have to be satisned for 
these strategies in order to be SPE strategies. 
Proposit ion 4.1 
The "immediate agreement" strategies are SPE strategies if and only if 
i) 0 < (1 - ó)g2(s°) < 8{x2 - x*2) and gi(s°) = 0, 
ii) 0 < (1 - S)g2(se) < 8(y2 - y'2) and c> ^gi{se) > 0, 
Ui) c < max{(l - 6)R1{sN) + 8x*r,Rl} - max{(l - 8)Rl(s°) + 8x1,R*ï}, 
Proof. 
(=>) Let t G IN be even and consider t -f 2. The strategies are SPE, thus the contract 
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x proposed by player 1 will be accepted by player 2. Therefore, x is the SPE contin-
uation payoff. Because the strategies are SPE the following two incentive constraints 
at the third stage of period t + 1 have to hold 
(1 - *)[i2i(5°) +
 gi(s0)} + 6xx < (1 - 8)R1(s°) + 6Xl (1) 
and 
(1 - 6)[R2(s°) + g2(s0)] + 8x*2 < (1 " W ( * ° ) + 8x2. (2) 
(1) is equivalent to gi(s°) < 0, which has to be the =-sign because ^1(5) > 0 by 
definition, and (2) can be rewritten as (1 — 8)g2(s°) < S(x2 — x2). Given g2(s°) > 0 
(by definition) it has to hold that x2 > x^. 
Player 1 will accept yi(s(t)) if yi(s(t)) > (1 — 8)R1(s°) + 6x1. Hence, c > 0 in 
order to have this constraint to hold for all s(t) € S. The incentive constraint for 
player 2, in case s^t) — Sj, for the offer y(se) is 
y2{se) = f2(ma,x{Rl,(l-8)R1(s°) + 6x1} + c) 
> / 2 ( m a x { ^ , (1 - 6)Ri(sN) + 6x1}) = vl-
This completes the proof for period 2 + 1. 
At the third stage of period t the following two incentive constraints have to hold 
(1 - S)[R1(se) + 9l(se)} + S/3 < (1 - S)Rl(se) + S[c + 0\, (3) 
where /3 = max{i£J\ (1 — ê)Ri(s°) + 6xi}, and 
(1 - 6)[R2(se) + g2(se)} + 8y*2 < (1 - 8)R2{se) + 8y2(se). (4) 
(3) is equivalent to 8c > (1 — 8)gi(se) > 0 and (4) can be rewritten as (1 — 8)g2(se) < 
8(y2 — y2). Given g2(se) > 0 it must be that y2 > y2. 
Finally, y2(se) = f2{yi(se)) > f2(y*) - y\ is equivalent to y\{se) < y\. Rewriting 
of this last inequality yields 
max{(l - 8)R1{sN) + 8x1, R'i) ~ max{(l - 8)R1(s°) + 8x1,R'1}> c. 
This completes the nrst part of the proof. 
(•^ =) The arguments of the proof of proposition 3.1 can be applied to prove that, given 
R(se) and R(s°), x and y(se) exist. The rest follows trivially from the nrst part of 
the proof because all incentive constraints are equivalent to the conditions stated in 
the proposition. • 
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Corollary 4.1 Suppose x = x* and y(se) = y*. 
The "immediate agreement" strategies are SPE strategies if and only if se and s° are 
NE actions. 
Proof. 
First, condition Ui) implies that g2(s°) = ^(-s6) = 0 and <7i(s°) = 0. Secondly, 
Vi = 2/i (5e) combined with condition iv) implies that the equilibrium compensation 
e equals 0. Therefore, gi(se) = 0. This means that se and s° belong to the set of NE 
of F. • 
Given these necessary and sufficiënt conditions an important question is what the 
procedure is to find the "immediate agreement" SPE strategies that yield player 2's 
highest SPE payoff given this type of strategies. Thus, the problem is 
max x-ii s.t. conditions %)-%%%) of proposition 4.1. 
se,s°eS, cgR+ 
Note that this optimisation problem also yields player I's lowest SPE payoff given this 
type of strategies, because the SPE contract x is Pareto efficiënt (that is x\ = / ï ^ ) ) 
and /2(maxx2) = m i n / i ^ ) = minxi (/i is strictly decreasing for x2 > R^)- The 
next proposition generalises the result of Bush and When [2] to the class of games 
considered in this paper. 
Proposition 4.2 Suppose players follow "immediate agreement" SPE strategies. 
Sufficiënt conditions to find the SPE strategy that yields player 2's maximum payoff, 
denoted by se,s°,c, are 
i) s° — m1, (player 1 is minmaxed) 
ii) c=^-f-gi(se), (minimal compensation) 
iii) se = arg maxse6s 
m a x { ^ , ( l - ê)R2(se) + 8f2( max{Z?*, (1 - 6)[Vl + 6-1g1{se)} + Sx,})}. 
Proof. 
From Standard bargaining theory [14] it follows that, given se,s° and c, the payoff 
X! is uniquely determined. Define a = (1 — 6)R2(se) and b = (1 — ë)Ri(s°) + c, then 
xi(a,b) is a fixed point that satisfies 
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a;1(a,6) = l(xi(a,b);a,b) := fi(m&x{Rl,a + 8f2(ma,x{R2,b + 6xi})}). 
Consider a < a and b > b, then it follows that for every z € I\ the following relation 
holds l(z; a, b) < l(z; a , b ). Hence, Xi(a, b) < Xi(a , b ). 
Minimising the value of b and taking into account the conditions of proposition 
4.1 yields c = ^<7i(se) and m1 = argminso€s.Ri(.s0), s.t. gi(s°) = 0. Substitution of 
these results into b implies that both a and b are functions of se. This implies that 
it is not possible to find se as the solution of a simple optimisation problem, but one 
has to solve the complex optimisation problem stated as condition iii). Thus, these 
three conditions are sufficiënt in order to find maxx2, because maxx2 = /2(min:ri). 
O 
Remark 4.1 
The function gi(s) need not be continuous. This implies that a solution of condition 
iii) may fail to exist. In that case it is possible to find player 2's supremum SPE payoff 
and one has to approximate the argument for which this supremum SPE payoff is 
attained. 
Remark 4.2 
The complex optimisation problem of condition Ui) reflects the trade off between a 
higher value of Rz(se) and a lower value of compensation ^j%i(.se). To illustrate 
that the Pareto boundary of the set F is also important in this trade off suppose that 
the function ƒ2 is continuously differentiable and F = F+. The first order Taylor 
expansion is equal to 
se = argrriaxJR2(5e) + f'2(.)gi(se), 
s e 65 
which reflects that the Pareto boundary is important in this trade off. 
(Note that /2(.) is negative.) 
Remark 4.3 
There is a subclass of games for the bargaining model in this paper that also satisfy 
the assumptions Bush and Wen [2] make. The games in this subclass satisfy /2(#i) = 
1 — Xi and Vi = v2 = 0 (see also examples 6.2 and 6.3). For this subclass of games it 
easily follows that 
- 1 6 -
8[1 - R^s0)] + [R2(s<) - 9l(s°)] 
*
2 =
 ÏTs • 
Gondition iii) reduces to the following optimisation problem 
max[ i ? 2 ( s e ) -^ (5 e ) ] . 
5 " O n e Sided Offer" Stra tegies 
The strategies introduced and analysed in this section are called "one sided offer" 
strategies, because if both players follow these strategies then it is as if oiily one 
player makes proposals (that are accepted) while the other player does not make any 
proposal (because this player's proposals are "unacceptable" and therefore rejected). 
This section is organised as follows. In the first subsection the "one sided offer" 
strategies are defined and then necessary and sufficiënt conditions are derived under 
which these strategies are SPE strategies. One of these conditions will be restated 
to obtain a simple graphical interpretation of this condition which is also usefull in 
computing the SPE strategy that yields a player highest SPE payoff given this type 
of strategies. 
The second subsection is concerned with the relation between weakly renegotiation 
proof (WRP) payoffs for Standard repeated games (Farrell and Maskin [7]) and SPE 
payoffs derived in the first subsection. It will be shown that WRP payoffs can be 
sustained as SPE payoffs in the bargaining game when players use "one sided offer" 
strategies provided the WRP payoffs satisfy one additional condition. This additional 
condition is automatically satisfied when a WRP payoff is Pareto efficiënt. 
5.1 Equilibrium Conditions 
Before the "one sided offer" strategies are formally defined some additional no-
tation is introduced. Without loss of generality we assume that player 2 makes the 
"acceptable" proposals and player 1 the "unacceptable" proposals. 
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As mentioned in section 2 each a G F can be approximated arbitrarily close by 
at most two vectors a*, a** G R(S) such that the continuation payoff at any period is 
also arbitrarily close to a. Let s*,s** £ S denote the corresponding actions to a*, a** 
respectively, and let < s(t) > , s(t) € {s*, 5**}, be the infinite sequence of actions that 
approximates a. As in the previous section, any deviation of player 2 is punished by 
the stationary SPE strategy with R(sN) as the NE payoffs in T that are "best" for 
player 2 and x* and y* the SPE payoffs made by player 1 and player 2 respectively. 
The "one sided offer" strategies are similar to the strategies used in the repeated 
games literature in the sense that a normal phase and a punishment phase are con-
structed. Denote the length of player I's punishment phase as T, T is assumed to be 
even, and let r denote the number of periods player 1 is already punished after this 
player's last (unilateral) deviation. The foUowing convention is adopted: If player 
1 deviates from playing the normal phase then the counting starts with r = 2 in 
the punishment phase at the first odd period after this deviation, and if player 1 
deviates during the punishment phase counting starts with r = 0 from the first odd 
period after this deviation. (Thus, counting does never start at even periods. After a 
deviation from the normal phase, it is as if the punishment phase had already started 
with r = 0 at the last odd period before this deviation occurred in the past.) Finally, 
given sp € S, player I's continuation payoff after being punished r periods in the 
punishment phase is defined as 
p1(r) = (l-6T-'r)R1(sO) + 8T-Ta1. 
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The "one sided offer" strategies, given by < s(t) >, are defined as follows. 
normal phase 
t even Stage 1 Player 1 proposes a contract with payoff (R™ax,R%). 
Stage 2 Player 2 accepts every contract that yields at least 
(l-6)R2(sp) + 6f2(Pl(2)). 
Stage 3 If players did not agree before, then s(t) are the dis-
agreement actions with payoff R(s(t)). 
t + l Stage 1 Player 2 proposes a contract with payoff 
y(t) = (« i , / i (a i ) ) . 
Stage 2 Player 1 accepts every contract that yields at least ÖI. 
Stage 3 If players did not agree before, then s(t + 1) are the 
disagreement actions with payoff R(s(t + 1)). 
punishment phase 
t even Stage 1 Player 1 proposes a contract with payoff (R™ax, i?*,). 
Stage 2 Player 2 accepts every contract that yields at least 
(l-ê)R2(sp) + 6f2(Pl(0)). 
Stage 3 If players did not agree before, then sp are the disagree-
ment actions with payoff R(sp). 
t + 1 Stage 1 Player 2 proposes a contract with payoff 
ï/P(T) = (pi(r),/2(p1(r))). 
Stage 2 Player 1 accepts every contract that yields at least pi(r). 
Stage 3 If players did not agree before, then sp are the disagree-
ment actions with payoff R(sp). 
Return to the normal phase when r = T. 
Restart the punishment phase after any deviation of player 1. 
Whenever player 2 deviates, then both players immediately follow the stationary 
SPE strategy with contracts ar* and y*. 
The notation is chosen in such a way that sp 6 S denotes the disagreement actions 
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in the punishment phase. The next proposition states the necessary and sufficiënt 
conditions that have to be satisfied in order for these strategies to be SPE strategies. 
Proposition 5.1 Let a G F + . If the following conditions hold 
i) s L x ^ > [Rrx - «i]/I«i - #i(*p)L 
ii)
 Gl > (1 - S)RT* + SlR^sP) + 9l(sr)], 
Ui) (1 - 6)R2(Sr>) + Sf2{Pl(2)) > f2(ai) and 
(1 - S)Ra(s>') + 8f2(Pl(0)) > /2(pi(l)) 
then the "one sided offer" strategies are SPE strategies for sufficiently large 8 < 1. 
The strict version of ii) is necessary if there does not exists an s G S such that 
simultaneously gi(s) = 0 and R(s) is Pareto efficiënt. 
Proof. 
(necessary conditions) In order for the "one sided offer" strategies to be SPE strategies 
the following incentive constraints in the normal phase have to hold. 
Consider player 1 first. First of all, player 1 should not have an incentive to deviate 
from s(t) and s(t + 1). This implies that the following two incentive constraint have 
to be satisfied 
(1 - 8)B?ax + Spi(2) <
 ai (5) 
and 
(1 - 6)[RTax + <5i?i(5p)] + 82Pl(2) < ax. 
(5) implies that Pi(2) < ax (because ax < R™ax). This means that the second 
inequality holds whenever (5) holds. Therefore, this second inequaltiy is disregarded 
in what follows. 
Player 1 will not deviate from proposing the contract with payoff (i?^ar,i?2) if 
there does not exists a contract with payoff c € F such that c\ > a^ and c2 > 
(1 — 8)R2(sp) + 6/2(pi(2)). This means that the following incentive constraint has to 
be satisfied 
(l-8)R2(sn + 8f2(Pl(2))>f2(ai). (6) 
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Player 2 does not have an incentive to deviate from the normal phase if f2(0-1) > y2, 
(1 - 6)R%ax + 8x* < (1 - 82)a2 + 82f2(ax) and (1 - 8)R2nax + 8y* < (1 - 8)a2 + 
6/2 («ï)- These constraints are certainly satisfied if the first inequality is strict and 
for sufficiently large 8 < 1. 
Secondly, the incentive constraints for the punishment phase are derived. Consider 
player 1 first. Player 1 should not have an incentive to deviate from sp. This implies 
that the following two incentive constraints have to be satisfied 
(1 - 8)1^(3^ +
 9l(sp)} + 8Pl(0) < Pl(r), (7) 
in case r odd and r > 1, and 
(1 - 6^*) +
 9l(sp) + SR^)] + 82Pl(0) < Pl(r), 
in case r even and T > 2. As in the normal phase, this last inequality holds whenever 
(7) holds and can therefore be disregarded. Furthermore, player 1 must not have an 
incentive to deviate forever (by rejecting and playing a best reponse to s2 forever), 
that is 
Ri(sp)+9i(sp)<Pi(r)- (8) 
Equations (7) and (8) can only hold iff either ai > Ri(sp) +gi[sp) and for sufficiently 
large 8 < 1 (note lim5_1p1(r) = a1? provided T is finite), or ax = Ri(sp) + <h(sp) and 
gi(sp) = 0 (if not #i(sp) = 0, then PI(T) < #i(sp) + #i(sp) for all 8 < 1 violating (7) 
)• 
Player 1 will not deviate from proposing (R™ax,R2') at the r-th period of the 
punishment phase if there does not exist a contract with payoff c such that c\ > pi(r) 
and c2 > (1 — 8)R2(sp) + £/2(pi(0)). If r is odd, then this constraint can be rewritten 
as 
(1 - 8)R2(sp) + 8f2(Pl(0)) > /2(Pi(r)), (9) 
provided Ri(sp) < aj. 
Substitution of pi(2) into (5) and rewriting yields 
^fc-i* - ó 1-8 -m-RW 
Finally, aa > px(r + 1) > PI{T) > pi(l) > pi(0) implies 
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/ a(ft(l))>/a(Pi(T))>/ a(pi<T+l)) 
and 
(1 - 8)R2(s*) + 8f2(Pl(2)) < (1 - 8)R2(sp) + 8f2(Pl(0)). 
Therefore, both equations (6) and (9) for r = 1 have to hold. 
Finally, if gi{sp) = 0 and a = R(sp), then P\(T) = ax and equations (6) and (9) 
both reduce to 
(l-S)a2 + 8f2(a1)>f2(a1), 
which can only hold when a2 > f^i^i)- Hence, a = R(sp) has to be Pareto efficiënt 
in this case. 
Player 2 does not have an incentive to deviate in the punishment phase provided 
player 2 does not have an incentive to deviate in the normal phase, because the pun-
ishment phase yields this player a higher payoff than the normal phase. • 
The way in which the third condition of proposition 5.1 is formulated has no 
obvious interpretation. However, this condition can be restated if a first order Taylor 
expansion is used to approximate f2(px(T)) (r = 0,1,2). This approximation will be 
in the point ax, because, by definition, P\{T) (T = 0,1,...,T) converges to ax as 8 
goes to 1. Because emphasis will be on limit SPE payoffs as 8 goes to 1 this point 
is a natural candidate. Define f2(ax) as the largest subdifferentiable in the point 
ax € [R^R^].4 The first order Taylor expansion of f2(pi(r)) (r = 0,1,...,T) is 
given by 
f2{P\{r)) « /2(fli) + / 2 (o i )b i ( r ) - «il-
The concavity of the function f2 implies that the approximation in the point X\ yields 
a higher value than the true value of f2 in this point. In order to reformulate condition 
in) it is necessary that the approximation is at most J2{PI(T)) when r = 0,2. This 
can be achieved for sufficiently small e > 0 and sufficiently large 8 < 1, because the 
line f2(ax) + [f2(ai) + e](pi(T) — ai) intersects the curve of/2 twice, once in some point 
xx(e) < ax and once in the point ax. For values in between these points the function f2 
lies above this line. Hence, for sufficiently large 8 < 1 all points pi{r) (r = 0,1, ...,T) 
are larger than xx(e) and J2(P\(T)) > f2(ax) + [f'2(ai) + C](PI(T) — ai)). In what 
follows we disregard the e > 0 and we leave it to the reader to verify that whenever 
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the conditions of the following proposition hold, then there exists a sufficiently small 
e > 0 such that the statement also holds in the limit as 8 goes to 1 given this e > 0. 
Note that if the function f2 is piecewise linear then this problem does not arise and 
e can be taken equal to 0. 
Applying the first order Taylor expansion implies that condition Ui) of proposition 
5.1 can be restated as in the following lemma for sufficiently large 8 < 1. 
Lemma 5.1 For sufficiently large 8 < 1 condition iii) of proposition 5.1 is equivalent 
to 
R2(sp) > /2(ai) + /2(oi)k - Ri{sp)]. 
The strict version is necessary if either f2 is not piecewise linear or a = R(sp) and 
gi(sp) = 0 but a is not Pareto efficiënt. 
Proof. 
Substitution of the first order Taylor approximation and the definition of Pi(2) into 
the first inequality of condition iii) of proposition 5.1 yields 
(1 - 8)[f2(ai) - R2(s>)] + f2(ai)S{l - 8T-2)[ai - R^s")} < 0, 
or, equivalently, 
R2(sp) > f*M + ÜM'-lijffifa - Rt{s>)] 
= /2(ai) + /;(a1)E[-12<5fc[a1-JR1(^)]. 
Hence, as 8 goes to 1, 
R2(sp) > /2(ai) + (T - 2)/2(«i)[ai - Ri(sp)]. (10) 
Similarly, the second inequality of condition iii) of proposition 5.1 can be rewritten 
as 
(1 - 8)[f2(ai) - R2(sn] - (1 - 8)[l - (1 + 8)8T-^(ai)[ai - R^s')] < O-
Dividing both sides by (1 — 8) and rewriting yields 
R2(sp) > f2(a1) - [1 - ^ ( l + SM'iMfa - Rris")} 
- /2(«i) + / 2 (oi ) [«i -^ i (^)] , 
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as ë —> 1. If this last inequality holds, then also equation (10) holds (because 
faM < o)-
The strict inequality follows from the fact that we should take a sufficiently small 
e > 0 in case the function is not piecewise linear as argued informally. O 
The condition R2(sp) > $2(0,1) + /2(ai)[fli — Ri(sV)] n a s a simple graphical in-
terpretation. The Taylor approximation is a line / tangent to the curve of / 2 at the 
point (a i , /2 (ÖI) ) . The reflection of the Une /, with the horizontal line through the 
point (a1 ; /2(ax)) as the mirror line, is denoted as the line / . The condition of the 
previous lemma states that the point R(sp) has to lie above the line / in order for 
a to be an SPE of the bargaining game. Denote p(r) = (PI(T) , / 2 (p i ( r ) ) ) , then this 
means that the convergence of (1 — 8)R(sp) + 8p(r) towards the point (a l5 f2(0-1)) 
(with approximated direction a-fl (IP) ) ^ a s *° ^ e fa s te r than the convergence of 
p(r) towards ( a i , / 2 ( Ö I ) ) (with approximated direction /2(ai))-
The last result of this subsection is the procedure to find the SPE strategies that 
approximate player 2's highest SPE payoff given these strategies. 
Proposition 5.2 Define ai(s) = Ri(s) + gi(s). Player 2's best "one sided offer" 
SPE strategy can be found by solving the following optimisation problem 
s* =argminai (s ) , s.t. R2(s) > f2(ai(s)) + f'2(oi(s)) gi(s). 
Proof. 
Condition (ii) of proposition 5.1 states that a^ > Ri(s) -f gi(s). However, as 8 goes 
to 1 every ax can be chosen arbitrarily close to Ri(s) + gi(s) as long as 
praa l _ 
T - l ck ^ n l ~ " 1 T - l = limE^-11<5k> 5 - 1 fc=1 a1-R1(s)' 
Without loss of generality we can take ai(s) as the approximated value. The function 
ƒ2 is strictly decreasing on [R^R^ax] and therefore rnaxJÉs/2(a1(3)) is the same as 
min s65ai(s). Obviously, the optimisation problem has to satisfy also the condition 
of lemma 5.1. Because gi(s) = a,i(s) — Ri(s) by definition and /?2(5) arbitrarily close 
to f2(oi(s)) + /2(a1(s))[a1(5) — Ri(s)] the >-sign can be written without loss of gen-
erality. ü 
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Remark 5.1 
The function gi(s) need not be continuous. In that case mi3€S Ri(s) + gi(s) has 
to be approximated arbitrarily close and s* can be taken as the argument of this 
approximation. 
5.2 Relation to Weakly Renegotiation Proof Equilibria 
In this subsection the relation between weakly renegotiation proof (WRP) payoffs 
for standard repeated games (Farrell and Maskin [7]) and "one sided offer" SPE 
payoffs is investigated. Sufficiënt conditions for the payoff a £ F to be a WRP payoff 
is that there exists s' € S (i = 1,2) such that 
1. ai > J2,-(a«') +
 gi(s% 
2. «jZRjis*), 
with (j = 1,2, j / i). The strict inequality of the first condition is necessary if 
gi(si) / 0 and is allowed to be an =-sign when <7,(s') = 0. Without going into much 
detail, the strategies Farrell and Maskin [7] use to support WRP payoffs in standard 
repeated games satisfy conditions i) and ii) of proposition 5.1. This means that only 
condition 2 differs from condition iii) of proposition 5.1. 
Proposition 5.3 
If a € F+ is WRP and condition iii) holds for R(s') (i — 1,2^, then (a,i,f2(ai)), 
(/i(a2), a2) and (oi,a2) are SPE payoffs for sufficiently large 6 < 1. 
Proof. 
The proof that (ai,/2.(ai)) is an SPE payoff of the bargaining game follows directly 
from the sufficiënt and necessary conditions of WRP and applying proposition 5.1. 
Renumbering the players yields that ( / ï ^ ) ^ ) is also an SPE payoff. 
To sustain (01,02) as an SPE payoff the strategies in the normal phase have to be 
adapted such that each player i (i = 1,2) proposes the contract that yields this player 
a payoff of ft™ax and the other player rejects. As long as players do not reach an 
agreement (and they never will in this normal phase) the disagreement actions are 
determined by the sequence of actions < s(t) > with resulting payoff a. If player 
i unilaterally deviates from the normal phase, then player i's punishment phase is 
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the same as described in the "one sided offer" strategies. These adapted strategies 
are also SPE because i) the strategies in the punishment phase are SPE and ii) each 
player receives an payoff in the normal phase as if the other player was the player 
who makes the "acceptable" proposals. As a consequence of proposition 5.1 no player 
has an incentive to deviate from this adapted normal phase. • 
Corollary 5.1 If a € F is Pareto efficiënt and WRP, then a is an SPE payoff for 
sufficiently large S < 1. 
Proof. Vector a is Pareto efficiënt implies that a = (a,-,/j(a;)). Furthermore, 
a £ WRP implies that there exists an sl G S such that Rj(sl) > ÜJ = fj(ai) 
and Ri(sl) < ai. Hence, Rj(sl) > /j(a.) > fj(ai) + /-(a,-)^,- — i2»(s')] and a satisfies 
the condition of lemma 5.1 for i = 1,2. • 
Evans and Maskin [7] have proved that generically all games have WRP payoffs 
that are also Pareto efficiënt, for sufficiently large 6 < 1. Corollary 5.2 states that all 
WRP payoffs that are also Pareto efficiënt have to be SPE payoffs of the bargaining 
model. This implies that for almost all games T the limit set of SPE payoffs that 
can be supported as "one sided offer" strategies in the normal phase has to be large. 
Therefore, it is generically impossible to obtain a unique SPE outcome. Thus, the 
model in this paper does not yield the uniqueness result obtained in the alternating 
offer model (Rubinstein [14]). However, example 6.3 has a unique WRP that is not 
Pareto efficiënt and which does not satisfy the conditions of proposition 5.1. As a 
consequence of corollary 5.1 this means that the set of SPE payoffs constructed in 
this section can be the empty set. But as said before, this result will only occur in 
very rare cases and is not general. 
6 Examples 
The following five examples show the variety of possible results. For the repeated 
prisoners' dilemma, which satisfies F+ — F and lini5_i WRP = F, the full Folk-
Theorem (every individually rational payoff can be supported as an SPE) is obtained. 
The second and third example, a simple Cournot-duopoly and the stone-scissor-paper 
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game (both taken from Farrell and Maskin [7]), which satisfy F+ = F but not 
lim$_»i WRP = F, show that the limit sets of propositions 4.1 and 5.1 are strict 
subsets of F. Example 6.2 shows that proposition 5.I's limit set of SPE payoffs is 
strictly larger than proposition 4.1's limit set of SPE payoffs. However, example 6.3 
shows the opposite result is also possible. Hence, no general result can be derived 
which states that one of these two limit sets contains the other limit set. Example 6.3 
is special because proposition 5.I's limit set is the empty set. As argued in section 5 
this result is nongeneric. 
For a large class of games T it holds that F+ ^ F. As a consequence of propo-
sition 3.2 the limit set of SPE outcomes, as 8 goes to 1, is reduced compared to 
the limit set of SPE payoffs predicted by the Folk-Theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin 
[9]). The battle-of-the-sexes game illustrates this point. Although the analysis and 
the examples seem to suggest that non-uniqueness is the general rule, there is a 
class of games T in which the set of SPE payoffs exists of exactly one element. The 
Pareto efficiënt frontier for this class of games exists of exactly one element, so that 
(R?ax,R*2) = (R!,R™ax) and F+ = {{R™ax,R*)}. 
Example 6.1 (Prisoners' dilemma) 
Li i?2 
Rx 
(4,4) (0,5) 
(5,0) (1,1) 
This example is also treated in Sorin [16] and van Damme [4]. Player i's minmax 
value Vi = 1 (i = 1,2) and the set F+ coincides with the set F in this example. 
Applying proposition 4.2 yields se = (Li,i?2) and gi{se) = 1. The corresponding 
equilibrium proposals are x = (1,4|) and y(se) — ( | , 2 0^"1), which converge to (1,4|) 
as 8 goes to 1. Thus, player I's lowest limit SPE payoff is equal to 1. By symmetry, 
player 2's lowest SPE payoff is equal to 1. Hence, the limit set of SPE payoffs 
associated with "immediate agreement" strategies is the whole set F. 
For this example it is sufficiënt to apply proposition 5.3 in order to obtain the 
whole set of "one sided offer" SPE payoffs. Van Damme [4] has shown that WRP — F 
for 8 > \. Farrell and Maskin [7] have shown that every a £ F can be sustained as 
a WRP with the pure strategies s1 = (Li,R2) and s2 = (7?i,L2). It can easily be 
checked that every a € F and s' (i = 1,2) satisfy the condition of lemma 5.1, because 
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i ^ s 1 ) > R%ax > /2(aa) (similarly for s2). Hence, the limit set of SPE payoffs 
associated with "one sided offer" strategies is the whole set F. 
Farrell and Maskin [7] have argued that this example is a-typical, because the pair 
of actions s1 = (Li, i?2) and s2 = (R\, L2) can sustain every a E F as an WRP payoff. 
This example is also a-typical in the context of this paper, because these two pairs of 
(punishment) actions automatically satisfy the conditions of lemma 5.1 independent 
of a e F. 
Example 6.2 (Cournot-Duopoly) 
Consider two firms in a Cournot-duopoly with revenue functions 
R(si,s2) = («1(2 - Si - s2),s2(2 - sx - s2)), 
where s; G [0,2] (i = 1,2) denotes the quantity produced by player i. 
This example is also treated in Farrell and Maskin [7]. Player i's minmax value 
Vi = 0 (i = 1,2) and the set F = {a £ R+|ai + a2 < 1}. Furthermore, player z's best 
response function fö(sj) = | (2 — Sj) (j = 1,2 and j ^ i). Player i's corresponding 
revenue &{%&)) = J(2 -Sjf. 
Applying proposition 4.2 (and remark 4.3) yields se = (0, f). Thus, R(se) = (0, | | ) 
and gi{se) = ^ . The corresponding equilibrium proposals are 
x = ( 1 4+5S ) and v(se) = ( 4+g2 2 4 g 2 + 2 5 g ~ 4 > ) 
V 5(1+5)' 5(l+fi)/ d l l U y^ l \25fi(l+5)' 25(1+5) / ' 
which converge to (53,75) as 8 goes to 1. Therefore, the limit set of SPE payoffs 
associated with "immediate agreement" strategies is the set {a € F|a1 ?o2 > ^ } / F. 
Proposition 5.2 is applied by first deriving the limit set of WRP payoffs and then 
solving the optimisation problem of proposition 5.2 for the limit set of WRP payoffs. 
For notational simplicity we only consider strategies that punish player 1. Farrell and 
Maskin [7] have proved that a £ WRP iff 16G! > (a2 + 4ai)2. The interpretation of 
the vector a (if this vector lies on this curve) is the following. If player 1 deviates from 
the payoff vector R{sl) = (0, a2) (with corresponding actions s1 = (0,1 + \/l — a2) ), 
then player I's deviation payoff is exactly at (which is equal to |[2 — (1 + \/l — a2)2]). 
Consider some vector a on the curve mentioned above, then R{s2) = (0,a2) has 
to satisfy the condition of lemma 5.1, that is a2 > 1 — 2a,i, because /2(ai) = 1 — 0]. 
Denote a* as the SPE payoff that yields player I's innmum SPE payoff, then a* has to 
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lie on the curve mentioned above and a*2 = 1 — 2a\. Solving yields a\ = | — \/2 < ^ 
(and s1 = (0,2 — 2y § — \/2) ). Hence, the hmit set of SPE payoffs associated with 
"one sided offer" strategies is {a E F\ai,a2 > § — y/2} ^ F. 
This example shows that there exist SPE payoffs in the bargaining game that 
are not WRP payoffs in the Standard repeated game. For example, every a € F 
that satisfies a\ > § — y/2 and 16ai < (a2 + 4ai)2 (the vector a lies above the curve 
mentioned above) are SPE payoffs in the bargaining game, but a does not belong to 
the set of WRP payoffs. On the other hand, this example also shows that not all 
WRP payoffs in the Standard repeated game can be supported as SPE payoffs in the 
bargaining game. All WRP payoffs b G F with one coordinate strict smaller than 
| — v 2 , including the Nash equilibrium of T, do not belong to the set of SPE payoffs. 
However, the most important result is that the limit set of SPE payoffs found by 
applying proposition 5.2 is strictly larger than the limit set of SPE payoffs found by 
applying proposition 4.2. This example also belongs to the class of games Bush and 
Wen [2] consider. This example shows that their claim that the limit set of equilbria 
is completely characterised by proposition 4.2 is not true. 
Example 6.3 (Stone-scissor-paper game) 
Li Mo Ro 
Mx 
Ri 
(1,0) (0,1) (0,0) 
(0,0) (1,0) (0,1) 
(0,1) (0,0) (1,0) 
This example is also treated in Farrell and Maskin [7]. Player i's minmax value 
Vi = | (i = 1,2) and the set F+ = F = {a 6 R^.|ai,a2 > | , a i + a 2 < 1}. The unique 
NE payoff is ( | , | ) and the corresponding mixed actions are sN = ((.3*5? 3)1(31 31 3))-
Applying proposition 3.1 yields stationary SPE payoffs x = (d^W, 3a+fï) ^n a ^ 
even periods t and y = (^n+t) 1 3(1+6)) *n a ^ o c ^ Peri°ds t. Both x and y converge to 
(5,5) as 8 goes to 1. Furthermore, Xi = y2 > \-
Applying proposition 4.2 yields mixed actions se = ((1,0,0), ( | , | ,0 ) ) , R(se) = 
( | , | ) and gi(se) = 0. The corresponding equilibrium proposals are x = (6(1^5), g r^ r ) 
and y(se) = ( ^ ± g ^ , ^ f ± | f ) , which converge to ( £ , i ) as S goes to 1. Thus, player 
I's lowest limit SPE payoff is equal to ^ . By symmetry, player 2's lowest limit SPE 
payoff is equal to j ^ . Hence, the limit set of SPE payoffs is the set {a £ F\al,a2 > 
5
-} ï F-12 
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Farrell and Maskin [7] have shown that the set WRP is a singleton, namely the 
unique NE payoff ( | , | ) . Applying proposition 5.3 yields that no WRP payoff satisfies 
the condition of lemma 5.1. Applying proposition 5.2 yields s* = êe. Thus, R{s*) = 
( | , | ) and gi{s*) = 0. As a consequence of proposition 5.2 it follows that a € F is a 
SPE payoff in "one sided offer" strategies if and only if a-y > R\{s*) +gi(s*) = ~. This 
R(s*) cannot be supported as an SPE payoff using the "one sided offer" strategies 
of section 5 where player 2 is punished with the stationary SPE, because ^(-s*) = \ 
and y2 > \- This implies that player 2 will certainly deviate at the third stage of all 
even periods. 
Renumbering the players and applying proposition 5.2 yields s** = ( ( | , | , 0 ) , (0,1,0)), 
R(s**) = ( | , | ) and ^(-s**) = 0. As before, a € F is an SPE payoff in "one sided 
offer" strategies if and only if a2 > R2{s**) + g-i(s**) = \- Similar reasoning shows 
that R(s**) can not be supported as an SPE payoff, because player 1 will certainly 
deviate. Hence, the limit set of SPE payoffs for this type of strategy is the empty 
set. As argued in section 5, this result is not general. 
This example and example 6.2 show that it is not possible to prove that one of 
the two limit sets of SPE payoffs (associated with propositions 4.2 and 5.2) contains 
the other limit set. 
Example 6.4 (Battle of the Sexes) 
J-i2 Rl 
i l 
Ri 
(3,1) (0,0) 
(0,0) (1,3) 
The set F+ does not coincide with the set F in this example. This game has two 
pure NE, namely (Li,!^) (with payoff (3,1) ), (i?i,i?2) (with payoff (1,3) ) and one 
mixed NE (su s2) = ((f, ±), (J, f)) (with expected payoff (f, f)) 
Applying proposition 3.1 yields that (3,1) and (1,3) can be sustained as station-
ary SPE payoffs. Combining these results with proposition 3.2 and the fact that 
stationary SPE strategies are a special type of "immediate agreement" strategies im-
plies that proposition 4.2 yields that the whole set F+ is the limit set of SPE payoffs 
associated with "immediate agreement" strategies. 
For the limit set of SPE payoffs found by applying proposition 5.2 the same result 
holds, because (3,1) and (1,3) are WRP payoffs and these payoffs also satisfy the 
conditions of proposition 5.3 for every a G F+. 
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Note that the mixed actions NE, which is also a WRP payoff, does not satisfy the 
conditions of proposition 5.3 and can therefore not be sustained as an SPE payoff. 
Thus, the bargaining game can not only reduce the set of SPE's predicted by the 
Folk-Theorem but also the set of WRP payoffs. 
Example 6.5 (F+ is singleton) 
L/2 R2 
In 
Ri 
(2,2) (1,0) 
(0,0) (0,0) 
This game is also treated in van Damme [4] and has a unique NE, namely (Li, L^), 
which is Pareto efficiënt. The Pareto efficiënt frontier of F is degenerated in the sense 
that it is the singleton {(2,2)}. Therefore, (R?ax,R*) = (R*,R2nax) = (2,2) and 
F+ = {(2,2)}. Proposition 3.1 implies that (2,2) can be sustained as a stationary 
SPE payoff and together with proposition 3.2 this result immediately implies that 
the limit set of SPE payoffs is the whole set F+ as 8 goes to 1. Note that we only 
obtain uniqueness in SPE payoffs and not in SPE strategies, because the strategies 
of proposition 5.1 are also SPE. 
7 Relat ed Work 
In this section some related work will be discussed. Okada [12] has analysed 
the same model, except that he assumes that both players use the limiting average 
criterion to evaluate their stream of payoffs. Okada [12] claims that the Folk-Theorem 
holds (the set of SPE payoffs is equal to the set F). Unfortunately, this result is 
not correct, unless F+ = F. If not (as in examples 6.4 and 6.5), then the strictly 
smaller subset F+ contains the set of SPE payoffs, because the arguments used in 
the proof of proposition 3.2 are also valid if the limiting average criterion is used 
instead of discounting. Secondly, by using the limiting average criterion to evaluate 
payoffs the bargaining model does not have the shrinking-cake property. Without this 
property even the Standard alternating offer model does not have a unique SPE. For 
the prisoners' dilemma (example 6.1) each Pareto efficiënt payoff can be obtained as 
a stationary SPE in the model of Okada [12]. With this multiple of equilibria it is 
not difficult to construct inefficiënt SPE payoffs in F. 
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Bush and Wen [2] analyse a model that is almost identical to the model of this 
paper. As long as players do not agree, they have to play the static game as in the 
bargaining model of this paper. The major difference is that in their model players 
do not bargain over the set F of the static game, but over some fixed surplus s E R+. 
This surplus s satisfies the condition that the line o^  + a2 = s hes either strictly 
above or is tangent to the Pareto frontier of the set F. Bush and Wen [2] give a 
characterisation result of the set of SPE payoffs and claim that they have derived 
a lower bound for each player's SPE payoffs for the class of games they consider. 
Unfortunately, they only consider "immediate agreement" strategies. Example 6.2 
(which also satisfies the assumptions Bush and Wen [2] make in case s = 1) shows 
that the set of SPE payoffs that results from "one sided offer" strategies is strictly 
larger than the set of "immediate agreement" strategies. Hence, the lower bound on 
the set of SPE's derived by Bush and Wen [2] is only valid for the type of strategies 
they consider and not for all type of strategies. 
The model of Bush and Wen [2] can be seen as a generalisation of the wage 
bargaining model of Fernandez and Glazier [8] and, Haller and Holden [10] in which 
one union and one firm bargain over the division of the profit. The static game in 
the latter model can be viewed as a degenerate static game in which the union has 
two options ("strike" and "not strike") and the firm has only one action (implement 
some old wage contract that is exogenously given). The action "not strike" is not 
only the unique NE of this static game but also the unique WRP equilibrium which 
happens to be Pareto efficiënt. In this model the "immediate agreement" strategies 
yield the largest set of SPE payoffs. 
The type of model that is analysed in this paper is also suggested by Cichocki and 
Stefanski [17] to analyse bargaining between the government and a major national 
firm, where state variables such as the government deficit and the firm's capital stock 
are taken into account. Houba and de Zeeuw [11] formalised this idea to a general 
bargaining model in a dynamic system with a finite number of periods and binding 
contracts. They also investigate finitely repeated games as a special case and find 
that for the prisoners' dilemma the bargaining model has a unique SPE in payoffs. 
Compared with the results for the prisoners' dilemma in this paper (a large set of 
SPE payoffs) it can be concluded that the set of SPE payoffs is discontinuous with 
respect to the time horizon. This discontinuity is also known from Standard repeated 
game models. 
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In the second subsection of section 5 the relation between weakly renegotiation 
proof equilibria (WRP) for standard repeated games (Farrell and Maskin [7]) and 
"one sided offer" SPE strategies has been investigated. To focus on WRP seems 
to be restrictive because several concepts of renegotiation proofness for standard 
repeated games have been proposed in the Hterature (Asheim [1], Bernheim and Ray 
[3], Farrell and Maskin [7], Rubinstein [13]), but actually it is not. The reason is that 
the concept of WRP is more or less the weakest concept of these concepts. Bernheim 
and Ray [3] have a concept, called "internally consistency", which is equivalent to 
the concept of WRP. Furthermore, every strong perfect equilibrium (Rubinstein [14]) 
is also WRP (but not visa versa). Only the concept introduced by Asheim [1] differs 
from the concept of WRP. 
8 conclusions 
In this paper the alternating offer model (Rubinstein [14]) is extended to capture 
the idea that in many economie situations agents have to interact strategically with 
each other while negotiating. In this paper this strategie interaction is modelled as 
a static game in between the bargaining rounds and the subject of the bargaining 
is an infinite sequence of actions in this static game. The analysis in this paper 
shows that the strategy space is complex. Therefore, it seems impossible to derive 
a characterisation result that fully determines the set of equilibrium payoffs (as the 
common discount factor goes to 1). 
In this paper two types of strategies are introduced in order to analyse the model, 
namely "immediate agreement" strategies (section 4) and "one sided offer" strategies 
(section 5). For each type of strategies sufficiënt and necessary conditions are derived 
under which these strategies are equilibrium strategies. By means of two simple 
examples (example 6.2 and 6.3) it is shown that it is impossible to derive that one of 
these two equilibrium sets contains the other set. Therefore, the set of equilibrium 
payoffs is at least the union of these two (sub)sets of equilibrium payoffs. Although it 
is possible that some other type of strategy exists that supports equilibrium payoffs 
that are not contained in this union, we conjecture that this seems unlikely and, 
therefore, it seems that we do have a characterisation result of the set of equilibrium 
payoffs. 
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Whatever the exact set of equilibria is, the previous sections show that the Folk-
Theorem (all individually rational payoffs are equilibrium payoffs) may hold, as for 
example the prisoners' dilemma shows, and may not hold in general, as for example 
the battle-of-the-sexes game shows. In this last case, introducing bargaining with 
binding contracts strictly reduces the set of equilibrium payoffs predicted by the 
Folk-Theorem. Although it has not been shown explicitly, non-uniqueness is the 
general case for the bargaining game in this paper. 
Regarding the two types of strategies introduced, it has been shown that "one 
sided offer" strategies are closely related to weakly renegotiation proof equilibria 
(Farrell and Maskin [7]). The basic idea underlying renegotation proofness (Asheim 
[1], Bernheim and Ray [3], van Damme [4], Farrell and Maskin [7], Rubinstein [13]) 
is that communication or renegotiations will lead to playing undominated strate-
gies. Although the negotiations over strategies in the repeated game is at the heart 
of this approach no attempt is made to model this bargaining process. The main 
characteristic of the bargaining model in this paper is that the bargaining process 
is explicitly modelled. Although the assumption of binding contracts is not in the 
spirit of the renegotiation proofness literature, the bargaining model (with binding 
contracts) shows that inefficiënt SPE outcomes are possible. This last result seems 
to contradict the basic assumption underlying renegotiation proof equilibria, namely 
that renegotiation will lead to playing undominated strategies. This result severely 
questions the foundations of the renegotiation proofness concept. Further investiga-
tions in order to find a complete noncooperative theory of renegotiation proofness in 
repeated games (in a similar fashion to the Nash program for bargaining theory) is 
necessary to give a complete answer to this problem. However, one of the problems 
that arises when the assumption of binding contracts is removed is the problem of 
"cheap talk" (see Farrell [6]). 
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Notes 
1. To avoid confusion later on we call this game the "static" game instead of the 
"stage" game, which is sometimes done in the literature on repeated games. 
2. The exact rules of the game state that any inefficiënt contract agreed upon at 
time t will be replaced at time t + 1, because it is assumed that there is only 
one bargaining round per period. However, for the limit SPE payoff, as 6 —> 1, 
of the subgame starting at period t the payoff at time t is irrelevant in the 
aggregate payoff and can therefore be disregarded. 
3. A stationary or history independent strategy is a function cr,(/j(2,0)) that is 
constant as long as players have not agreed, which means that for every history 
h(t, 0) the stationary strategy prescribes the same action to be undertaken. 
4. Given ƒ2 strictly decreasing this is the smallest subdifferentiable in absolute 
value. 
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